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 Model organisms, the use of green fluorescent proteins, and orthogonal transfer RNA 
(tRNA) are examples of artificial causes being used in biology. Recent work characterizing the 
research interests of biologists in terms of a common set of values has ruled out artificial causes 
as biologically interesting. For instance, Kenneth Waters argues that biologists are primarily 
interested in causes that actually obtain. Similarly, Marcel Weber argues that biologists are 
primarily concerned with biologically normal interventions. Both views express a widely 
received attitude about the interests and goals of biologists as being primarily concerned with the 
contingent facts of our world. While I agree with this general attitude about the contingent nature 
of biology, I argue that neither view fully accounts for the diversity that distinguishes the 
discipline. Along with actual and biologically normal causes, biologists are also interested in 
artificial causes for technological and observational purposes. I maintain that research interest in 
artificial causes provides some pragmatic reasons for thinking that research programs in cellular 
biology aren’t driven by a common core set of values. 
 
§2. Causal Selection 
 
 Recent claims about the explanatory interests of biologists have emerged from the causal 
selection debate. Causal selection is the thesis that some causes from among the set of genuine 
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causes are ontologically significant. Philosophers have analyzed causal selection in terms of 
difference-making and INF-specificity. The gene serves as the paradigmatic cellular factor of 
causal selection in biology for both approaches. 
 Causal selection in philosophy of biology is the rejection of Millean parity. Millean parity 
grants that there is a way to distinguish between causes and non-causes, but denies that there is 
any principled way of singling out some causes as ontologically important to an effect. 
Distinguishing among causes may be justified owing to pragmatic values or interests, but there is 
no ontological basis that differentiates some causes from others. There is controversy over who 
actually holds Millean parity.1 Nevertheless, an argument that is often read as a defense of 
Millean parity in biology invokes the complex and highly interdependent nature of 
developmental systems as evidence for the claim that any ontological distinction among causes is 
arbitrary and unjustified.2  
 Difference-making and INF-specificity analyses of causal selection hold that the singling 
out of some causes as ontologically significant is justified on ontological grounds. Proponents of 
causal selection argue that implicit in the experimental practices of cellular biologists are criteria 
for the singling out of some factors – most notably the gene – for the purposes of manipulating 
and controlling biological outcomes. These criteria are justified not because of pragmatic 
considerations, but rather because of the ontology of causal relationships.3  
  The difference-making criteria analyzes causal selection in terms of factors whose 
presence or absence makes a difference to an outcome.4 Suppose that of the ten mouse traps set 
                                                          
1 Griffiths and Stotz 2013; Griffiths forthcoming. 
2 Lewontin 1974; Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama, Griffiths and Gray 2001. 
3 To say that difference-makers or INF-specific causes are ontologically significant isn’t to say that such causes are 
foundational, metaphysical entities. Difference-makers and INF-specific causes are ontologically significant because 
their criteria don’t’ reflect the interests and values of the speaker or observer. Satisfying the criteria of difference-
maker or INF-specificity is to possess a set of causal properties that other relevant factors do not. 
4 Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 2007. 
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up in my home only one snaps. The traps are identical in all relevant ways. The amount of 
tension on the spring and the amount of bait resting on the catch are the same and so is the size, 
shape and weight of each. The cause whose presence explains the difference between snapped 
and unsnapped traps is the passing by of a mouse. In this scenario, the mouse is the important 
cause of the difference among traps; it is the difference maker.  
 Genes often function as difference makers in biological experiments. A common 
experimental method for testing the causal contribution of a cellular factor in developmental 
biology involves carefully controlled breeding regimens of model organisms. These breeding 
regiments generate populations of organisms that are genetically identical with the exception of 
one (or several) factor(s) that is allowed to vary in the population. Genes are often the factor that 
is allowed to vary against an otherwise identical genetic and environmental background.5 On the 
assumption that the population is uniform in all relevant ways, researchers infer that differences 
in a phenotypic trait – say, eye color – are due to differences in a particular gene or set of genes.  
 The INF-specificity criteria is a refinement of the difference-making criteria. It analyzes 
causal selection in terms of a system of counterfactual dependence according to which a range of 
possible input states map onto a range of output states with paradigmatic cases marked by a one-
to-one relationship between inputs and outputs.6 INF-specific relationships are like a refrigerator 
thermostat with a range of different settings each of which corresponds to one and only one 
temperature. Setting the dial to 2 activates the cooling mechanism to bring the refrigerator to 2.5 
degrees centigrade, while setting the dial to 3 raises the temperature to 5 degrees, and so on.7 
                                                          
5 Waters’ actual difference-making account derives heavily from the experimental methods of Bridges and Morgan 
(1919) whose work exclusively used genes as actual difference makers. 
6 Waters 2007; Woodward 2010; Weber forthcoming. 
7 INF-specific relationships admit of degrees. INF-specific relationships can vary in the degree to which they 
approximate a perfect one-to-one mapping. An INF-specific relationship can also have a greater degree of 
specificity in comparison to another INF-specific relationship insofar as the codomain of the latter is a proper subset 
of the codomain of the former. 
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 Protein coding genes relate to the amino acid sequence of proteins in an INF-specific 
way. DNA consists of four types of nucleotide bases – adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine. 
Genes specify proteins in units of three nucleotides (or codons), which map onto one and only 
one of 20 canonical amino acids (with some redundancy). For instance, the codon with three 
cytosine nucleotides (CCC) always codes for the amino acid proline and nothing else.8 The same 
goes for all other amino-acid coding codons. Setting aside the issue of redundancy, each 
variation in the codons of a gene maps uniquely onto one and only one protein. Thus, a range of 
gene variants systematically correlate with a range of proteins in much the same way as the 
settings of the thermostat in the previous example map onto a range of temperatures.9 
 Difference-making and INF-specificity are criteria for singling out some causes as 
ontologically significant to an effect. On both analyses, the gene serves as the paradigmatic 
cellular factor of causal selection in biology. Representatives from both approaches have offered 
justifications for why other cellular factors – most notably transfer RNA – aren’t singled out as 
ontologically significant causes of proteins, which they take to be indicative of the explanatory 
values distinctive of biologists. 
§3. tRNA: A Finicky Lot 
 Biologists rarely pick out transfer RNA (tRNA) as ontologically significant causes of 
proteins. Representatives from both the difference-making and INF-specificity analyses have 
argued that the practice of picking out genes rather than tRNA tells us something about the 
explanatory values of biologists. Weber argues that biologists are primarily interested in 
                                                          
8 There is some redundancy in the genetic code in that more than one codon can specify the same amino acid. For 
instance CCA can also code for proline. This is how the relationship between genes and proteins have a degree of 
INF-specificity in the sense mentioned in the previous footnote.   
9 This is a rather idealized example.  First, we are not considering whether all variations in a gene can produce viable 
proteins. Second, most (perhaps all) cases of protein synthesis (especially in eukaryotic cells) undergo various 
complex editing and splicing processes at the stages of gene expression leading up to translation, which can change 
the number of proteins a gene can specify.  
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biological normality while Waters argues that biologists are primarily concerned with actual 
difference makers. Both proposals are an attempt to identify a core set of investigative values 
that guide research in cellular biology.  
 tRNA are complex molecules found in most cells whose function it is to deliver the 
precise amino acid to the correct codon of a genetic message during protein synthesis. tRNA are 
a finicky lot. Their job requires it of them. Each tRNA has two important points of contact: the 
anticodon and the acceptor stem.10 The anticodon recognizes only one type of codon and the 
acceptor stem recognizes only one type of amino acid.11 This ensures that the correct amino acid 
associates with the correct codon. For instance, a tRNA whose anticodon only recognizes the 
cytosine nucleotide triplet (CCC) will only carry proline on its acceptor stem. A widespread 
caricature of protein synthesis says that codon specificity of tRNA is universal. From bacterium 
to elephant, each codon associates with its favorite amino acid and nothing else. According to 
this caricature, any variation in codon specificity of tRNA is likely to be fatal for the cell or 
organism.  
 Were the codon specificity of tRNA to vary, tRNA could satisfy the criteria for causal 
selection in much the same way as the gene. Against a genetic and environmentally uniform 
population, tRNA could serve as difference makers. For differences in the amino acid associated 
with particular type of tRNA could account for differences in protein. Similarly, a range of 
variation in the anticodons of tRNA could systematically correlate with a range of different 
proteins in an INF-specific way.  
                                                          
10 See images 1 and 2 in appendix. 
11 tRNA recognize the correct amino acid  with the help of another important enzyme called the aminoacyl-tRNA 
synthetase. This enzyme interacts with both the anticodon and acceptor stem to charge the tRNA with the 
appropriate amino acid. 
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 Representatives from both the difference-making and INF-specificity approaches to 
causal selection assume that the lack of interest in varying the codon specificity of tRNA tells us 
something about the core investigative values of biologists. Marcel Weber has argued that the 
hypothetical INF-specificity of tRNA is irrelevant to the explanatory interests of biologists. For 
cellular biologists are primarily interested in biologically normal interventions or interventions 
that  
1. may also be due to natural processes and 
2. are compatible with the continued persistence of the biological entity that is being 
considered.12 
 
Weber assumes that variation in tRNA codon specificity will inevitably fail to meet both criteria 
for biological normality. For not only does codon specificity not vary in the natural world, but its 
variation is often fatal for the biological entity in question. Hence, concludes Weber, biologists 
aren’t interested in the hypothetical INF-specificity of tRNA. 
 Ken Waters argues that the potential difference-making abilities of tRNA are also 
uninteresting to biologists insofar as biologists are primarily concerned with actual difference 
makers. Actual difference makers are difference makers that actually vary; whereas, potential 
difference makers are factors that could account for differences in an outcome were they to vary 
but happen to not do so. Biologists, argues Waters, are primarily concerned with actual, rather 
than potential, difference makers. Because codon specificity never actually varies, tRNA are 
merely potential difference makers whose varying “does not matter to biologists unless different 
tRNA has actually existed or is likely to exist actually in the future.”13 
                                                          
12 Weber forthcoming, 27. 
13 Waters 2007, 576. 
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 In saying that biologists are primarily interested in studying biological normality or actual 
difference makers, Weber and Waters are identifying a core set of explanatory values that guide 
research in cellular biology. Biological normality and actual difference makers are concrete 
proposals of a more general attitude that says biology studies the contingent facts about the 
world. On this picture, biology is the science of a particular range of possibilities that is narrower 
than the range of possibilities that, say, physics studies. Biological generalizations don’t describe 
laws of nature,14 they contain many heterogeneous exceptions, and only hold in a restricted range 
of contexts.15 In pointing to the finicky nature of tRNA, Weber and Waters are identifying a 
range of contexts in which biological generalizations do not hold and, thus, do not receive 
research attention.   
 Weber and Waters assume that the lack of interest in varying codon specificity of tRNA 
tells us something about the core investigative values of biologists. Variation in codon specificity 
of tRNA is neither biologically normal nor actual; hence, Weber and Waters conclude that 
biologists aren’t interested in picking it out as ontologically significant. In pointing to a range of 
contexts in which biological generalizations do not hold, Weber and Waters are carrying on a 
general attitude that says biology studies contingent features of the world. While I agree with the 
general thesis about the contingent nature of biology, I consider whether these authors have 
identified the principle explanatory values of biologists in the next section.   
§4. Artificial Causes 
 In discussing the achievement of variation in codon specificity of tRNA and other 
examples of artificial causes, I argue that biological normality and actual difference making do 
not account for the diversity of interests among cellular biologists. Artificial causes can be of 
                                                          
14 Smart 1959; Beatty 1995. 
15 Mitchell 1997; Woodward 2000. 
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significant interest to biologists as forms of technology. Yet they can fail to be biologically 
normal in Weber’s sense insofar as they are wholly unnatural. They also challenge Water’s 
account of actual difference-making insofar as prior to being made actual causes, biologists must 
spend significant time thinking about the non-actual. 
 The development of site-specific incorporation of unnatural amino acids using orthogonal 
tRNA in living cells was first achieved by Peter Schultz and associates in 2000.16 It involves the 
addition of a non-standard amino acid – an amino acid that doesn’t belong to the 20 canonical 
ones – to a “stop codon” or the nucleic acid triplet that tells the protein synthesis machinery to 
halt protein production. Since every tRNA associates with one and only one amino acid, the 
incorporation of a non-canonical amino acid requires the engineering of an orthogonal tRNA; a 
tRNA that isn’t native to the cell.17  Orthogonal tRNA are produced in one organism (often 
bacteria) but are engineered to operate in the cells of another organism (bacteria, yeast, mice, 
roundworm, and human).18 Orthogonal tRNA undergo random genetic modification and several 
rounds of trial and error (a process called directed evolution) to achieve variation in the 
anticodon and acceptor stem that function to associate the unnatural amino acid with the desired 
stop codon. 
 Orthogonal tRNA and other artificial causes are useful for observational purposes and for 
engineering solutions to real world problems. As an observational tool, artificial causes can 
allow researchers to gather data about the activities of the components of a causal system that are 
otherwise difficult to observe and measure. Orthogonal tRNA have been used to incorporate 
                                                          
16 Wang et al. 2000. 
17 As mentioned in footnote 11, tRNA are charged with the appropriate amino acid with the help of an aminoacyl-
tRNA synthetase. Site specific incorporation of unnatural amino acids, thus, requires the engineering of an 
orthogonal aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase enzyme as well as an orthogonal tRNA. 
18 Liu and Schultz 2010. 
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fluorescent markers at specific sites in a protein, making the conformation structure more easily 
visible.19 Another powerful technology that has become standard in much of cellular biology has 
been green fluorescent protein (GFP) as a genetic marker. The GFP gene normally occurs in 
various marine organisms. By introducing the GFP gene into the genome of another organism, 
embryo development is made easily observable as fluorescent proteins are produced alongside a 
gene of interest.20 Even the selective breeding of model organisms is a technology that enables 
researchers to observe the effects of difference makers in lab-raised populations. 
 Artificial causes can also help solve real world problems. As a tool for generating novel 
effects, artificial causes exploit the behavior of a causal system. The use of orthogonal tRNA to 
engineer antibodies that bind with cancer-fighting drugs (antibody-drug conjugates) is a new way 
to treat cancer while minimizing unwanted side effects.21 Artificial causes may not always 
improve the observational abilities of researchers but can be a way of putting a causal system to 
a new purpose. 
 Research interest in artificial causes like orthogonal tRNA defies the explanatory values 
that Weber attributes to biologists. Artificial causes don’t satisfy Weber’s first criterion of 
biological normality insofar as they are wholly unnatural causes. Orthogonal tRNA are a 
technology only achievable in the lab. Hence, according to Weber, orthogonal tRNA and other 
artificial causes that fail to meet his first criteria of biological normality shouldn’t be of interest 
to cellular biologists.  
 Waters’ emphasis on the actual also has trouble accommodating artificial causes. Waters 
asserts that biologists are primarily interested in actual difference makers. As potential difference 
                                                          
19 Wang et al. 2006. 
20 Chalfie et al. 1994. 
21 Axup et al. 2012. 
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makers until their creation in the lab, orthogonal tRNA should not have been of interest to 
biologists prior to 2000. But the development of orthogonal tRNA – and other types of artificial 
causes – requires that biologists imagine and hypothesize the non-actual in order to be made 
actual difference makers. Artificial causes are less of a serious challenge to Waters than to 
Weber. For once artificial causes are made actual, Waters’ actual difference-making account can 
explain the research attention they receive.  
 While the development of artificial causes is a significant area of research in biology, the 
domain of biological inquiry also includes biological normality and actual difference makers. As 
Waters has pointed out, the use of actual difference makers has a long history in biology and it 
continues to be a powerful experimental method today. 22  Hence, Waters’ focus on the actual 
may be over-stated rather than misguided. For orthogonal tRNA had to be made actual 
eventually lest a loss in research interest might have occurred. Similarly, much research 
involving the experimental variation of genes is research into biological normality. Again, 
Weber’s emphasis on biological normality isn’t misguided, but is rather over-stated. It is 
noteworthy that the orthogonal tRNA research program satisfies Weber’s second criteria of 
biological normality. Part of Peter Shultz’ success in developing orthogonal tRNA was that he 
was the first to achieve site specific incorporation of unnatural amino acids in living cells. Were 
the use of orthogonal tRNA to regularly result in the death of the biological entity, it is possible 
that research interest would have waned. 
 Not only are the explanatory values of cellular biologists diverse, but they are likely to 
change as research programs develop. While researchers have known for some time that the stop 
codon of some types of mRNA can be reassigned an amino acid, research on the frequency with 
                                                          
22 For a recent use of actual difference makers that employ an epigenetic factor as an actual difference maker see 
Dolinoy et al. 2006. 
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which this occurs in single-cell populations hadn’t been studied until recently. (Ivanova et al. 
2014) A caricature of protein translation assumes that mRNA codon specificity to be universal 
across species. Yet, recent research shows that stop codon reassignment is fairly extensive in 
single-celled organisms. This new development challenges the caricature of protein translation 
that has been widely disseminated since the formulation of Crick-information and is likely to 
push research interests in new, unexpected directions. It may even push research interest in the 
direction of varying tRNA codon specificity – as the orthogonal tRNA research program has 
done. 
 While the explanatory values of cellular biologists are diverse, the immense rate at which 
research programs develop and mature into distinct sub-disciplines sheds doubt on whether 
biological inquiry is guided by a common set of core values. The values and interests of cellular 
biology grow and develop along with the maturation of distinct sub-disciplines and research 
programs; hence, it is unlikely that a core set of values will be shared among researchers. Any 
characterization of the common core values shared among cellular biologists is likely to turn out 
false shortly after it is announced.   
§5. Conclusion 
 In discussing artificial causes, I show that focus on biological normality and actual 
difference makers doesn’t account for the diverse explanatory values of cellular biologists. The 
interests and values of cellular biologists are diverse – including research programs that 
investigate artificial causes as well as biological normality and actual difference makers. Not 
only is cellular biology driven by a diversity of values, but such values are likely to change as 
research programs develop. The rapid rate at which research programs mature, thus, makes it 
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unlikely for cellular biologists to all share a common core set of values. For the values of 
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